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Abstract 
Testimony agreement across a number of people can be a reassuring sign of a claim’s 
reliability. However, reliability may be undermined if informants do not respond 
independently. In this case, social consensus may be a result of indiscriminate copying or 
conformity and does not necessarily reflect shared knowledge or opinion. We examined 
children’s emerging sensitivity to consensus independence by testing whether it affected their 
judgements in a social learning context. Children ages 5, 6 and 8-9 years (N = 92), and 20 
adults for comparison, received conflicting testimony about an unfamiliar country from two 
consensual groups of informants: An independent group who responded privately and a non-
independent group who had access to each other’s answers. We found increasing levels of 
trust in independent consensus with age. Adults and 8-9 year-olds preferred to accept the 
claims of the independent consensus, whereas 5-year-olds favored the claims of the non-
independent consensus and 6-year-olds were mixed. Although previous work has shown that 
children trust a consensus over a lone dissenter as young as 2 years, the developmental shift 
in this study indicates that children’s reasoning about the nature of consensus and what makes 
it reliable continues to develop throughout middle childhood. 
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Thinking for themselves? The effect of informant independence on children’s 
endorsement of testimony from a consensus   
As adults, we regularly utilize the knowledge of others to gain information about the 
world that we have not acquired directly. Although we are aware that people’s beliefs may 
not always be accurate, when a number of sources agree on a particular point we feel more 
confident that their view is correct and can be trusted (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Claidière 
& Whiten, 2012; Kelley, 1973). The consistency of testimony across different individuals 
means that people from multiple perspectives, who have individual learning experiences, 
perceptions and memories, nonetheless think the same. Following the consensus is likely to 
be a relatively safe strategy because, as Eaves and Shafto (2012) noted, the probability of 
unreliable or unhelpful informants converging on the same inaccurate claim is low (see also, 
Haun, Van Leeuwen, & Edelson, 2013). However, this is not necessarily true in all cases 
where people’s testimony is in agreement. A crucial factor is the independence of informants 
from one another. Independence can refer to a number of factors, including whether or not 
individuals are personally connected in some way, and whether people’s claims all originate 
from the same or separate sources (e.g., the same book vs. different books). Here, we focus 
on informants’ independence in terms of their awareness of each other’s testimony at the time 
of responding. 
Humans are highly susceptible to social influence when making decisions in a social 
context, whether for informational or normative reasons. When individuals are aware of the 
decisions of others, they are prone toward “herd behavior” (Banerjee, 1992, p. 798), 
abandoning their own opinion to converge with others (e.g., Schneider & Watkins, 1996), 
especially when uncertainty is high (e.g., Allan, Midjord, Martin, & Gabbert, 2012). In such 
cases, they may believe that others are better informed than they are (Lorenz, Rauhut, 
Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011). Moreover, a perceived social pressure to conform may lead 
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people to publicly agree with others despite privately disagreeing in order to avoid censure or 
embarrassment (Asch, 1956; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; but see Bond & Smith, 1996 for 
contradictory findings). Consequently, although it is possible that when individuals make 
decisions publicly they converge on the same answer independently, there are no guarantees. 
The challenge posed by a non-independent consensus is that observers cannot be certain to 
what extent members were influenced by each other’s judgments. Compared to an 
independent consensus then, it provides a more questionable epistemic marker as consistency 
across individuals does not necessarily validate their responses as correct.  
The current research aimed to examine how sensitivity to consensus independence, 
and the impact of this factor on testimony reliability, emerges in development. In recent 
years, substantial work has examined children’s developing ability to engage in epistemic 
vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010) and attempted to elucidate their criteria for acceptance or 
rejection of testimony from others (for reviews see Harris, 2012; Mills, 2013; Robinson & 
Einav, 2014). Researchers have investigated not only how children evaluate testimony from 
individual informants, but also whether they attend to the number of people who endorse a 
claim. Findings indicate that the tendency to trust a consensus arises early on. Preschoolers 
are more likely to endorse an informant’s claim if it receives explicit assent (displayed via 
nods and smiles) rather than dissent (displayed via head shakes and frowns) from two 
bystanders (Fusaro & Harris, 2008). Moreover, children do not require agreement to be 
explicitly marked by verbal or non-verbal cues; consistent testimony across informants 
suffices. For example, children as young as 2 years are more likely to act on a novel 
apparatus to locate a reward in accordance with the same behavior displayed by three peers 
than an alternative behavior shown an equal number of times by an individual (Haun, Rekers, 
& Tomasello, 2012). Preschoolers more frequently trust the claims of three consensual 
informants than those of a dissenting individual when learning to identify referents for novel 
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labels (Corriveau, Fusaro, & Harris, 2009). In addition, 3-6 year-olds are more likely to 
imitate faithfully a novel action sequence that is demonstrated identically by two models 
rather than twice by a single model (Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013). It is 
not currently clear to what extent the consensus effect demonstrated in these studies arises 
because children deem a consensual view as more reliable than the belief of one individual, 
rather than being a result of social motives (e.g., to align oneself with the group).  
Importantly, however, mounting evidence suggests that children can reason about the 
reliability of the consensus in a given situation rather than blindly follow the crowd. When 
the epistemic credentials of the majority and the dissenter are unknown (as in the above 
studies), children trust the consensus, but when consensus reliability is undermined by other 
epistemic cues, they endorse the dissenter. Specifically, plausibility or conventionality of 
testimony (Bernard, Harris, Terrier, & Clément, 2015; Guerrero, Cascado, Sausa, & Enesco, 
2017; Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014), informants’ expertise (Boseovski, Marble, & Hughes, 
2017), access to knowledge (Einav, 2014), previous accuracy (Bernard, Proust, & Clément, 
2015), and previous success (Wilks, Collier-Baker, & Nielsen, 2015) all trump the consensus 
cue, although the evidence is mixed regarding the age at which children recognize when it is 
best not to trust the majority. In several studies, this was seen from 4 years, whereas in others 
not before 5 or 6 years of age. These mixed findings may be due to a number of 
methodological differences across tasks that have yet to be disentangled systematically (e.g., 
type of epistemic cue pitted against the consensus; variations in the way the protagonists were 
presented (live actors, videotaped actors, puppets, or characters in vignettes); children’s prior 
knowledge; content domain). Nevertheless, age-related changes may indicate that younger 
children follow the consensus for social reasons, and therefore do so regardless of its 
epistemic reliability, whereas older children follow the consensus only in situations where it 
retains its epistemic value (see Bernard, Proust et al., 2015).  
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By age 6 then, children reason about the reliability of a consensus, but it is an open 
question whether they view independence as a relevant factor. Notably, in the above studies 
the informants appeared to provide their testimony independently, either acting 
simultaneously (e.g., via pointing), thereby preventing copying, or successively but 
separately. (For exceptions where individuals were privy to previous informants’ testimony, 
see Schillachi & Kelemen, 2014; Wilks et al., 2015.) However, the epistemic implications of 
this aspect of consensus were not discussed. The most relevant work to date from Hu, 
Whalen, Buchsbaum, Griffiths and Xu (2015), found that 3-5 year-olds placed more trust in a 
consensus where all group members had direct perceptual access to the novel information 
(box contents) versus a consensus where only one member had access and the remaining 
members explicitly based their opinion on that informant’s testimony (i.e., “[S]he said this 
[toy/snack] was better, so I think this [toy/snack] is better”). Accordingly, individuals’ 
responses were independent in one consensus group and non-independent in the other. 
However, the two groups also differed with respect to the number of individuals who had 
perceptual access. Consequently, the study is informative in showing that children deem 
consensus based on visual access as more reliable than consensus based on hearsay but does 
not address to what extent independence alone influences children’s evaluation of testimony 
reliability. Moreover, consensual responses in the hearsay group were explicitly marked as 
contingent on the first informant’s testimony, whereas we were interested in whether children 
spontaneously infer the possibility of copying among individuals who are aware of each 
other’s answers.       
In sum, although young children’s tendency to endorse a consensus over a dissenter 
has been examined in a number of studies, much less is known about development after the 
preschool years and involving more complex scenarios where children must reason not 
simply about the number of people who agree on a claim but about the nature of the 
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agreement. In the present study, we aimed to address this gap in the literature. More 
generally, we sought to extend previous work on children’s critical thinking that has largely 
focused on evaluation of individual informants who provide their testimony in the absence of 
a social context. By contrast, we wished to shed some light on children’s developing ability 
to consider how a person’s testimony may be influenced by the testimony of others and how 
that social context impacts the reliability of what they say. 
We presented participants with conflicting testimony from two groups, each 
composed of three individuals whose responses were always in agreement. In one group, the 
informants answered privately, whereas in the second group, they answered publicly. Our 
intuition, which we checked in this study, was that adults would distinguish between the two 
types of consensus and place more trust in the former. Our primary aim was to examine age-
related changes: We asked whether 5-, 6- and 8-9 year-olds differ in the way they consider 
the reliability of the two consensus groups. We tested 5- and 6-year-olds in light of the 
findings that at this age children can scrutinize the reliability of a consensus group on the 
basis of various competence cues (Bernard, Harris et al., 2015; Einav, 2014) and extended the 
age range to 8-9 years because of concurrent development in children’s understanding of how 
social motivation may influence individuals’ behavior (for review see, Mills, 2013), which 
we considered relevant to our task.  
Specifically, there is evidence to suggest that children learn about self-presentation 
(the desire to shape others’ beliefs about the self) gradually and only start to attribute self-
presentation motives to explain why others’ behavior may deviate from their actual thoughts 
or feelings from about the age of 8 years. For example, 6-year-olds have difficulty identifying 
self-presentation motives (e.g., wanting to avoid being seen as stupid or a coward) to explain 
falsely expressed emotions (Banerjee, 2000, 2002; Banerjee & Yuill, 1999). In addition, 
children’s ability to attribute embarrassment to others increases between 6 and 11 years 
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(Banerjee, 2002). To the best of our knowledge, the question of when children explain others’ 
or their own behavior in terms of conformity has not been addressed empirically. Studies 
have shown that children themselves are susceptible to conformity from the age of 4 years 
(Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Corriveau, Kim, Song, & Harris, 2013; Haun & Tomasello, 
2011). However, the literature cited above suggests that the capacity for recognizing 
conformity in others may not emerge for several years. If children fail to consider potential 
social motives for copying (e.g., to avoid embarrassment or to seek approval), they may 
initially take non-independent agreement at face value (i.e., all informants think this way) 
rather than recognize that there may be a mismatch between what the informants believe and 
what they say. We therefore anticipated that 5-6 year-olds would be less likely to question the 
reliability of the non-independent consensus compared to 8-9 year-olds. 
Furthermore, the younger children may not recognize that although the independent 
consensus members must each come up with the answer on their own, the non-independent 
individuals’ answers may all stem from the mind of the informant who answers first, 
reducing the reliability of this consensus to a single person’s testimony. This type of 
reasoning requires an ability to infer that the second and third informants may themselves be 
ignorant or uncertain (mental state) despite providing an answer (behavior). Young children 
are sensitive to verbal and non-verbal cues of uncertainty in others and moderate their trust in 
informants’ testimony on the basis of this information (e.g., Birch, Akmal, & Frampton, 
2010; Jaswal & Malone, 2007; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001). Further, 4-5 year-olds are less 
likely to trust an informant who in the past explicitly relied upon a third party for providing 
accurate information rather than generating the answers on his own (Einav & Robinson, 
2011). However, in the current study, the informants did not give any indication of 
uncertainty so the possibility that the second and third informants may not have known the 
answer had to be inferred. Indeed, we specifically chose to tell participants that the 
9 
 
informants in this group were told to look at each other’s answers so that their looking would 
not be interpreted as a sign of uncertainty (or as cheating) to avoid confounding these factors 
with non-independence.  
In the current study, the testimony related to information regarding an unfamiliar 
country. Participants were told that the informants had taken part in a lesson about the 
country to clarify that all of them had acquired the information in the same way. We chose to 
ask about knowledge of an unfamiliar country as a way of presenting children with 
information that a) they would have no prior knowledge about, and b) the informants only 
recently learned and could feasibly get correct (i.e., remember accurate information from 
their lesson), incorrect (e.g., misremember) or be unsure about (e.g., be unable to remember). 
Similar to the established selective trust paradigm (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005), participants 
could choose to endorse one of the groups’ suggestions or an alternative third option on a 
series of trials. Following the test trials, participants were asked explicitly to judge which 
group they believed the most and to justify their choice.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 92 children whose parents provided written informed consent. 
There were twenty eight 5-year-olds (Mage = 5;7, range 5;0 to 5;11, 13 females), thirty two 6-
year-olds (Mage = 6;6, range 6;0 to 6;11, 15 females) and thirty two 8-9 year-olds (Mage = 
8;11, range 8;2 to 9;9, 17 females). All children were native English speakers and 
predominantly white middle class, although a range of socioeconomic backgrounds and 
ethnicities were represented. Children were recruited from two local schools and from 
Summer Scientist Week, an outreach initiative run by the University, where local children 
visit the University and take part in a range of psychology studies.   
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Materials and Design  
Two groups of three female actors (ages 18-21) formed the informant groups: 
Independent Consensus (IC) and Non-independent Consensus (NIC). Every child was 
presented with the testimony of both groups on every trial. These were shown through video 
clips on a laptop using PowerPoint. The videos were positioned in the center of the screen; 
one below the other (the position of the IC and NIC were counterbalanced across 
participants). The informants in both groups sat at a table with the same three pictures laid 
out identically in front of them on every trial. On test trials, the IC were separated from each 
other by barrier walls, which were absent for the NIC (see Figure 1).  
Each vignette began with the voice of an off-screen speaker, ostensibly the 
informants’ teacher, asking them the question for that trial (e.g., “Which is the right flag for 
this country?”) The informants always responded in the same order, left to right, when their 
name was called out (e.g., “Lucy!”) Each named informant looked at her three pictures and 
selected one of them, holding it up in the air and looking directly at the camera before placing 
it on the table and removing the other pictures. The key difference in the way the IC and NIC 
responded is as follows: When each informant responded in the IC, the remaining informants 
looked straight ahead. In contrast, when the first NIC informant picked her chosen picture, 
the other two informants leaned over and looked at her answer (see Figure 1). Similarly, 
when the middle informant picked her chosen picture, the informant on her right, leaned over 
and looked at her answer. Finally, the second and third informants glanced at the previous 
informant’s selection while they reached for the same picture to emphasize that their choice 
was not independent.   
Each group picked one of three picture cards that answered a question in the stimulus 
book about a fictional country called Markovia. The three actors in each group always chose 
the same picture; however, the responses were different across the two informant groups 
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(e.g., 3 football cards vs. 3 basketball cards). Videos were counterbalanced in two ways 
across participants; in terms of the female actors who made up the IC and NIC, and the 
responses given by the two groups. This resulted in four videos that were counterbalanced 
equally across children per age group. The stimulus book about Markovia consisted of five 
pages (one example and four experimental trials), each with a question, background 
illustrations relating to the question topic (e.g., a plate for the food trial; flag bunting for the 
flag trial) and a blank space for the child’s picture answer. Question topics included housing 
(example trial), flag design, food, scenery and sport. These were always presented in the 
same order. The three corresponding picture cards were also presented live to the child 
participant.  
Procedure  
Children were tested individually in a quiet area near their classroom or at the 
University. The experimenter (E) began by introducing the child to the “faraway country” of 
Markovia and the book about it, indicating the gaps and explaining it would be the child’s job 
to fill them in with the correct pictures. The example trial served to introduce children to the 
task. E presented the child with three picture cards for a question about the type of housing in 
Markovia. E explained that she recently visited the country and so knew a bit about it. She 
then picked one of the three cards and demonstrated positioning it in the book.  
In the four experimental trials children were required to select pictures and fill in the 
book themselves but were told that they could have some help, “Now it’s going to be your 
job to fill in the other pages with the right pictures. But before you do that, I'm going to let 
you see what these girls on the computer think about Markovia [E showed stills of both 
groups and told the participant what each girl was called]. They’ve all had a lesson about this 
country. The teacher in the video is going to ask them questions about it. So, you’ll be able to 
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see what they pick and that should help you decide which pictures should go in the book, 
OK?”  
Next, still images were shown of the two groups with their set of pictures ready for 
the first trial, and the barriers set up between the IC informants. E explained that the IC group 
could not see each other’s responses because of the dividing blocks between them. (Children 
were then familiarized with an identical divider and experienced not being able to see how 
many fingers E held up behind the divider to ensure they understood its opaqueness.) 
Similarly, E explained that the NIC group did not have any barriers between them and that 
they were told to look at each other’s answers before they reply; a demonstration of leaning 
forward to look was given: “Now, the girls in this group [point at NIC group], were told to 
look at each other’s answers before they reply, so you’ll see them lean over and have a look 
(demonstrate lean forward). The girls in this group [point at IC group] can’t look at each 
other’s answers before they reply because of these barriers [point at barriers]. Here is a 
barrier just like theirs, let’s put it between us. Can you see how many fingers I put up behind 
this barrier? That’s right, you can’t see through it. They can’t see each other’s answers 
either.”  
At the start of each trial, the child was presented with the question in the stimulus 
book and the three relevant picture cards. For example, “this page says: the sport most people 
like to play there is…and then there’s a blank, so you need to decide which of these three 
sports is most popular in Markovia, football, basketball or cricket.” The position in which the 
three pictures (IC choice, NIC choice, distractor) were placed in front of the child (top, 
middle or bottom) varied randomly across participants and across trials. The two informant 
videos were then presented, “now let’s watch what the girls in the videos picked and then you 
can decide”. On each trial, E played the IC and NIC videos one after the other saying, “now 
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let’s see what these girls picked”. The order in which the testimony of the IC and NIC were 
presented alternated across trials.  
After watching both videos, children were reminded of the actors’ decisions with a 
still shot of each group with their chosen picture cards in front of them (see Figure 1, right). 
Children were then instructed to choose the correct picture from their selection to go in the 
book. Each response was coded as either following the IC, the NIC or picking the distractor. 
Neutral feedback was given. This procedure was repeated for three more trials. 
To examine children’s explicit group evaluation and their justifications, children were 
presented with still shots of the groups following the test trials and asked, “which group of 
girls did you believe the most? Why is that?” Finally, there was a memory check of group 
independence, “which group looked at each other’s answers? Which didn’t look?” (order 
counterbalanced). All children correctly responded to the memory check. 
Coding and Reliability 
 Justifications in response to the explicit judgment question fell into five categories: 1) 
Believed IC more because of their independent answering or because NIC were not 
independent (e.g., “Because they [IC] couldn’t be influenced by each other – had to stick to 
what they thought”, “Because the others were copying each other”); 2) Believed NIC more 
because of their non-independence (e.g., “Because they didn’t have the blocks”, “because 
they can see each other’s pictures”); 3) Content-based, (e.g., “Their answers looked right”, 
“because they picked football”); 4) The appearance of the informants or liking them more 
(e.g., “They looked a bit serious”, “looked more clever”); 5) residual, (e.g., “Don’t know”, “I 
think so” or no response). An independent rater coded half of the responses from each age 
group, and interrater agreement was 90% (Cohen’s κ = .85). Disagreements were resolved by 
discussion. 
Adult Group 
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Twenty undergraduate university students (10 females, range: 20-22 years, Mage = 
21.1 years) volunteered to take part in an adapted version of the experiment. Participants 
were tested individually and viewed the same stimuli as the child participants but these were 
self-administered on a laptop using PsychoPy software (Peirce, 2007). All the instructions 
were presented in writing on screen and the participants entered their forced-choice responses 
via the keyboard. For the open-ended justification question, responses were made verbally 
and noted down by the experimenter.  
Results 
Adult Data 
 First, we checked our intuition that adults tend to treat an independent consensus as 
more reliable than a non-independent consensus. All but three adults endorsed the IC 
response on every trial and only one participant never did so. Moreover, 95% participants 
stated that they believed the IC more and justified this with reference to their independent 
responses (e.g., “They came to the same answer separately so they are more likely to be 
right”; “The others [NIC] were all influenced by the first person, they [IC] all chose the same 
so small probability of it happening by chance.”)  
Children’s Endorsement Trials 
 For each child, we counted the number of times children chose the IC, NIC and 
distractor responses across the four trials. Figure 2 shows the mean percentage for each 
possible choice as a function of age group. In the analyses that follow we first examined age-
related differences in children’s endorsement of the IC. We then ran planned comparisons of 
the mean for each possible choice (IC, NIC, or distractor) against chance level. Although 
only two of the three pictures were selected by the informant groups in each trial, 25% 
children selected the choice that was not indicated by either group on at least one trial of four. 
(Five 5-year-olds chose the distractor on 1 trial, two on 2 trials, and one on all 4 trials; one 6-
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year-olds chose the distractor on 1 trial, six on 2 trials, and two on 3 trials; three 8-9 year-olds 
chose the distractor on 1 trial, one on 2 trials, and two on 4 trials.) Accordingly, chance was 
calculated to be 1.33 of a possible total of 4 (probability of success per trial (0.33) x 4). This 
criterion has been used in previous selective trust studies where participants were given a 
choice of three responses but only two were indicated by the informants (see Bernard, Proust, 
et al., 2015; Corriveau et al., 2009). However, we also ran a second comparison to directly 
test whether participants had a systematic preference for endorsing one group over the other.  
Preliminary analyses found no significant effects involving gender or video version 
therefore these two factors were not included in the following analyses. A one-way between-
groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the number of times participants picked the same 
picture as the IC found a significant main effect of age, F(2, 89) = 6.98, p = .002, ηp2 = .14. 
Posthoc tests using Bonferroni correction found that 8-9 year-olds picked the picture 
endorsed by the IC significantly more often (M = 2.44, SD = 1.39) than the 5-year-olds (M 
=1.50, SD = .75) and the 6-year-olds (M = 1.63, SD = .94), p = .003 and p = .01, respectively. 
The two younger groups did not differ from each other. (Due to non-normality of the data and 
heterogeneity of variance, we also ran non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis analysis and follow-up 
Mann-Whitney comparisons on the number of times children endorsed the IC choice. These 
produced an identical pattern of results to the ones reported above.)   
Planned comparisons against a chance score of 1.33 on the number of times children 
picked the same as the IC found that only 8-9 year-olds did so at rates higher than chance, 
t(31) = 4.51, p < .001, d = .80, whereas 5-year-olds and 6-year-olds responded at chance: 5-
year-olds, t(27) = 1.21, p = .24, ns, d = .23, and 6-year-olds: t(31) = 1.77, p = .09, ns, d = .32. 
In contrast, the two younger age groups picked the same as the NIC at rates higher than 
chance: 5-year-olds, M = 2.04, SD = 1.10, t(27) = 3.38, p = .002, d = .65, and 6-year-olds, M 
= 1.78, SD = 1.04, t(31) = 2.46, p = .02, d = .43. The older group picked the answers given by 
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the NIC at rates no different to chance, M = 1.16, SD = 1.17, t(31) < -1, p = .41, ns, d = .15. 
All groups picked the distractor at rates lower than would be expected by chance (ps < .001). 
Next, we examined whether participants showed a systematic preference for one 
group over the other on those trials in which they endorsed the choice of one of the groups. 
(Note that the 3 participants who chose the distractor across all 4 trials were not included in 
this analysis.) Children were categorized into displaying one of three strategies: ‘IC 
endorsers’ sided with the IC on more trials than they sided with the NIC, ‘NIC endorsers’ 
sided the NIC more than the IC, and ‘Mixed’ endorsed the groups an equal number of times 
(See Table 1).  
Chi-square analysis revealed that the pattern of responses across age groups was 
different, χ2 (4, N = 89) = 26.07, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .38 with an apparent shift from NIC 
endorsement as the most frequent strategy among 5-year-olds to a more frequent mixed 
response among 6-year-olds, to IC endorsement as the prevalent strategy among 8-9 year-
olds. Additional analyses in each age group compared i) the number of children who showed 
a preference for one group (either IC or NIC) versus the number of children who were mixed, 
and ii) the frequencies of the two consensus endorsement strategies. The findings confirmed 
that 8-9 year-olds were more likely to show a preference than be mixed, χ2 (1, N = 30) = 
19.20, p < .001, and among those who showed a preference, IC endorsement was 
significantly more frequent than NIC endorsement, χ2 (1, N = 27) = 6.26, p = .012. Six-year-
olds were just as likely to be mixed as they were to be systematic, χ2 (1, N = 32) = 0, and 
among those who showed a preference, the number of IC endorsers was comparable with the 
number of NIC endorsers, χ2 (1, N = 16) = 1, p = .32. Finally, 5-year-olds were not 
significantly systematic as a group, χ2 (1, N = 27) = 3.00, p = .083, but among those who 
showed a preference, NIC endorsement was significantly more frequent than IC endorsement, 
χ2 (1, N = 18) = 5.56, p = .018.  
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Children’s Explicit Judgments and Justifications 
For the analysis of children’s response to the explicit judgment question, “Who did 
you believe the most?” and the justifications analysis below, we excluded two 5-year-olds, 
four 6-year-olds and two 8-9 year-olds who gave a ‘both’, ‘neither’ or ‘don’t know’ response 
despite a further prompt to choose one group. Chi-square goodness of fit tests revealed that 
the two younger groups’ judgments were not systematic: 5-year-olds, IC: 42%, NIC: 58%, χ2 
(1, N = 26) = 0.62, p = .43 and 6 year-olds, IC: 46%, NIC: 54%, χ2 (1, N = 28) = 0.14, p = 
.71. In contrast, 8-9 year-olds chose the IC significantly more often than the NIC, IC: 70%, 
NIC: 30%, χ2 (1, N = 30) = 4.80, p = .03.  
Justifications for the explicit judgment question were coded according to the coding 
scheme outlined above. Figure 3 presents the frequency distributions of the various 
justification types, by age group. Focusing first on justifications for picking the IC because of 
their independence or the non-independence of the NIC (e.g., “They’re (IC) not actually 
looking at each other, thinking for themselves, other three (NIC) could have been wrong, all 
looked at each other”) versus all other responses combined, Chi-square tests with Yates’ 
Continuity Correction revealed that 8-9 year-olds were much more likely to mention 
independence (60% participants) than 5-year-olds (8% participants), χ2 (1, N = 56) = 14.40, p 
< .001, Phi = .54, and 6-year-olds (25% participants), χ2 (1, N = 58) = 5.88, p = .02, Phi = .35. 
There was no difference between 5- and 6- year-olds. The most frequent alternative response 
for the youngest children was failure to give a relevant justification (38%); however, it is 
worth noting that a minority (19%) justified picking the NIC because of their non-
independence (e.g., “They could see each other’s pictures”; “they know because they 
copied”). This response was also given by 25% 6-year-olds and 17% 8-9 year-olds. Finally, 
few participants cited the informants’ appearance/behavior or having a preference for either 
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of the groups as a justification, suggesting the groups were well matched and that participants 
did not view one as generally more positive or likeable than the other.   
Discussion 
We examined children’s epistemic trust in consensual testimony that arose via 
independent versus non-independent means. This study extends previous work on children’s 
selective learning from a consensus versus a dissenter to examine how sensitivity to the 
nature of agreement between individuals – rather than simply the presence of it – emerges in 
development. As predicted, we found increasing levels of trust in independent consensus with 
age. Like the adults, 8-9 year-olds were more likely to accept the claims provided by the 
group whose responses were independent over the group who could look at each other’s 
answers. In addition, children at this age were more likely to pick the IC as the group they 
believed the most, with the majority of children citing independence as their justification. In 
contrast, 5-year-olds favored the NIC’s claims in their endorsements although they were not 
systematic when explicitly asked who they believed the most. Six-year-olds were more mixed 
in their responses; like the 5-year-olds they endorsed the NIC (but not the IC) at rates above 
chance but their most frequent response was to endorse both groups to the same extent, and 
children were almost equally split in their explicit judgments.  
Our findings suggest that there is a developmental shift in children’s reasoning about 
consensus independence. Interestingly, 5-year-olds’ endorsements were influenced by this 
cue but in the opposite direction to 8-9 year-olds and adults, whereas 6-year-olds appeared to 
be transitioning between the two positions. Thus, children are sensitive to the relevance of 
whether or not individuals forming a consensus have access to each other’s testimony from a 
young age, and they may interpret this information differently across middle childhood.  
Why did the younger children prefer to follow the advice of the NIC? We explore 
three possible explanations: First, children might have viewed the fact that the NIC were able 
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to see each other’s answers as giving them an advantage over the IC, as if this extra 
informational access served to increase their authority. Indeed, some children justified their 
decision for believing the NIC in this way (e.g., “Because they could look”).  
Second, they may have perceived the two groups differently, assuming the NIC to be 
friends but regarding the IC simply as three individuals. Perhaps the barriers introduced a 
psychological distance between the IC that was absent from the NIC. If so, the younger 
children may have endorsed the NIC ‘friends’ because they viewed them as a collective with 
whom they wished to affiliate more than the IC. Previous work suggests that 5-year-olds’ 
trust in the consensus may, under certain circumstances, be driven by social rather than 
epistemic reasons, in contrast to older children (Bernard, Proust, et al., 2015). An interesting 
question is whether this social motivation is particularly compelling if the consensus 
members are perceived as friends. We think this explanation is unlikely, however, for two 
reasons. First, participants did not mention friendship in their justifications for trusting the 
NIC. Second, both groups of informants were shown sitting side-by-side (i.e., without the 
barriers in place for the IC) when they were initially introduced to participants. We therefore 
think it more plausible that participants would have perceived the groups similarly and 
accepted that each group was given a different set of instructions regarding whether or not 
they could look at each other’s answers, akin to real-life class situations where classmates are 
split into groups that are given different task instructions. Nonetheless, it would be useful to 
introduce the two groups explicitly as friends (or alternatively as strangers) in further work to 
test this account.   
The third explanation is that children might have interpreted the non-independent 
consensus as a sign of active agreement between the informants that was lacking among the 
independent group. That is, by deciding to agree with informant 1’s responses, informants 2 
and 3 provided supportive evidence that she was right. Just as children trust testimony that 
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receives explicit bystander assent, as displayed through nods and smiles (Fusaro & Harris, 
2008), they may view the act of copying as a sign of the copiers’ approval, which bolsters the 
reliability of the testimony for them. One 6-year-old expressed this reasoning when justifying 
why she believed the NIC the most, “because if they’re copying, it might be the right thing.” 
From a philosophical standpoint, this can be seen as a rational response. According to Lackey 
(2013), copiers’ own background beliefs or assessment of the original source’s credibility 
should enable them to monitor the testimony critically, so their decision to agree is in itself an 
informative reliability marker. However, in reality copying does not necessarily constitute 
critical and deliberate endorsement of this kind. Goldman (2001) argued that, “When Y is a 
non-discriminating reflector of X, Y’s opinion has no extra evidential worth […] above and 
beyond X’s opinion. […] The same point applies no matter how many putative experts share 
an initial expert’s opinion” (pp. 101-102). The epistemic value of non-independent 
consensus, therefore, hinges on the copiers’ reasons for agreeing with the original source. If 
children do not question these, they have no cause to distrust such agreement but rather may 
view it as more compelling than a consensus that arises independently.  
Thus, it may be that the age-related changes found in the current study relate to 
inferences children make about the knowledge and motives of the copiers. For example, the 
findings may reflect growing skepticism about whether or not the second and third NIC 
informants knew the answer rather than relying on the knowledge of the first informant. 
Although children as young as 3 years are sensitive to others’ verbal and non-verbal cues of 
ignorance or uncertainty (Birch et al. 2010; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001), the ability to infer 
the possibility of these mental states in the absence of overt markers is likely to emerge later. 
Until such skepticism arises, children may believe that all members of the NIC know the 
answers and are therefore no different than members of the IC who must each come up with 
the answers on their own. In contrast, older children will recognize that the testimony of the 
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NIC potentially stems from one source who might be wrong. Future research could examine 
this by asking children to rate the knowledge of each of the informants that make up an 
independent and non-independent consensus, respectively. Younger children would be 
expected to attribute equal knowledge status across members of both groups whereas older 
children would be expected to show a difference between groups, attributing equal 
knowledge status to all of the IC members but greater knowledge to the first NIC member in 
comparison to the second and third informants.  
Age-related changes may also reflect children’s growing appreciation of alternative 
psychological reasons, other than shared knowledge, that could underlie non-independent 
agreement, which have to be learned and inferred. Specifically, children needed to recognize 
that informants in the NIC might have gone along with the previously stated answers, even if 
they privately disagreed, to avoid being the odd one out or looking stupid. This account is 
consistent with the finding that around 8 years of age children develop an understanding of 
how intentions and motivations, particularly self-presentation, influence behavior and may 
lead to a mismatch between people’s thoughts and actions (Banerjee, 2000, 2002; Banerjee & 
Yuill, 1999; Mills, 2013). Before this development children might not even consider the 
possibility that someone might change his or her answer after hearing someone else’s reply. 
One way to test this account in future research would be to ask children about the beliefs of 
the second and third NIC informants. Older children should agree that these informants 
(particularly the last responder) might think that the correct answer is in fact different from 
what they stated, whereas younger ones would deny that.  
Interestingly, our developmental shift mirrors similar shifts in middle childhood, 
where certain cues that elicit skepticism among older children and adults have been found to 
produce the reverse effect among young children (see Heyman, 2014). For example, 9-10 
year-olds judge a neutral judge as being more likely to be fair than a judge with a positive 
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personal connection to contestants, whereas 5-6 year-olds show the opposite pattern, 
preferring the connected judge to the neutral judge (Mills & Keil, 2008). Children who are 
10-11 years treat self-reports about people’s evaluative traits (e.g., intelligence or honesty) 
with skepticism, whereas 6-7 year-olds claim self-reports to be credible sources of 
information (Heyman & Legare, 2005). Further, 8-year-olds recognize that claims that are 
consistent rather than inconsistent with someone’s self-interests are less trustworthy, but 5-6 
year-olds show the opposite pattern (Mills & Keil, 2005). Our findings add to these by 
suggesting that children may first view non-independence as a positive cue for trust before 
they realize that it can negatively impact the reliability of testimony. 
Although age-related changes were found, there were also substantial individual 
differences within each age group. What distinguishes the children who preferred to trust the 
IC from those who preferred the NIC and from those who did not differentiate between the 
two? It seems plausible that differences in both the ability and motivation to engage in 
mentalizing play a role. In our task, participants were faced with two groups of informants 
who on the surface agreed with each other. It was only through considering how the 
informants’ mental states might differ between the independent and non-independent 
conditions that the two groups could be distinguished appropriately. As Miller (2012) 
suggests, there may be individual differences “such that some people routinely search for 
mentalistic underpinnings to behaviour whereas others require strong prods before moving 
beyond surface-level explanations” (p. 201). Previous studies of selective trust with 
preschoolers have found links with performance on theory of mind tasks (e.g., Brosseau-
Liard, Penney, & Poulin-Dubois, 2015; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; Lucas, Lewis, Pala, Wong, & 
Berridge, 2013; but see also Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007). Moreover, 
individual differences in skepticism found among 6-9 year-olds have been linked to advanced 
social cognition skills, specifically interpretive theory of mind (Mills & Elashi, 2014). Aside 
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from this, very little is known about the factors that help some children to be better than 
others at evaluating social sources of information; this remains a key question for further 
work. 
It will also be important to build on the current study by examining children’s 
responses to consensus independence in other social learning contexts. Here, we focused on 
fact-learning, in line with the majority of research on selective trust. However, the results 
could differ for other types of testimony such as subjective or value-laden information about 
objects, other people, or a course of action (see Boseovski & Lee, 2008; Boseovski et al., 
2017), and in more complex situations involving testimony about different kinds of 
procedures and practices.  
In sum, our findings extend previous work on children’s selective learning by 
indicating that although the tendency to place trust in a consensus arises as early as 2 years 
(Haun et al., 2012); children’s reasoning about what it is that makes a consensus reliable 
continues to develop over a protracted period. Across 5-9 years of age children displayed a 
growing realization that independent agreement – where individuals’ responses cannot be 
influenced by the responses of others – is more reliable than non-independent agreement. The 
youngest children were more likely to endorse the claims of the non-independent consensus 
indicating that they interpret testimony independence differently than older children. These 
findings highlight the need for further research into children’s developing understanding 
about other social factors that have a bearing on the reliability of group views. For example, 
social diversity (differences in race, gender, age, political leanings or ideologies) has been 
argued to be an important condition for consensus reliability, where agreement is considered 
more reliable when it arises among a heterogeneous rather than homogenous group of 
individuals (Miller, 2013). It remains a fascinating open question whether children would be 
sensitive to differences in the compositions of groups, when situated in a child-relevant 
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context, and how views about the epistemic implications of this dimension might change 
across development.  
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Table 1  
Percentage of participants, by age group, who predominantly sided with the Independent 
consensus (IC), the Non-independent consensus (NIC) or were mixed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Age IC
 e
nd
or
se
rs
 
M
ix
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N
IC
 e
nd
or
se
rs
 
5-year-olds (n = 27) 14.8 33.3 51.9 
6-year-olds (n = 32) 18.9 50.0 31.3 
8-9 year-olds (n = 30) 66.7 10.0 23.3 
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Figure 1. Examples of the NIC (top panel) and IC (bottom panel) informant groups at time of 
first informant’s response (left) and with final screen shots of all responses (right).  
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Figure 2. Percentage of choices linked to the independent consensus (IC), non-independent 
consensus (NIC), and distractor for each age group.  
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Figure 3. Frequency distributions of justifications for why children believed a particular 
group over the other, by age group. 
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